09 Harsanyi A Utilitarian Response to Rawls

  • Rawls's Theoretical Framework:

    • John Rawls, in A Theory of Justice, contrasts two traditions in moral philosophy: utilitarianism and contractarianism (social contract theory).
    • Rawls introduces the "original position" under the "veil of ignorance," where rational individuals choose principles of justice without knowing their social or economic status.
  • Maximin Principle & Difference Principle:

    • Maximin Principle: You should choose the option where the worst possible outcome is the best among all the worst-case scenarios. In other words, focus on minimizing the worst-case harm.
      • Rawls uses the maximin decision rule for individuals in the original position, emphasizing the welfare of the least advantaged in society.
    • The "difference principle" emerges from this, suggesting institutions should maximize the welfare of the worst-off.
    • Difference principle: Inequalities in wealth, power, or resources are acceptable, but only if they help the people who are worst off in society.
  • Harsanyi's Objections:

    • Irrationality of the Maximin Principle:

      • In real-world scenarios, the maximin principle often leads to paradoxical and impractical decisions.
      • Example: Preferring highly improbable outcomes (e.g., avoiding air travel due to a slight risk of a plane crash) over significant benefits (e.g., a better job in another city).
      • Rational decisions require balancing risks and rewards using probabilistic and utility-based reasoning, as per Bayesian decision theory.
    • Critique of the Difference Principle:

      • Harsanyi highlights morally questionable outcomes under Rawls’s difference principle:
      • Allocating scarce resources (like medicine or education) to the worst-off, even when this provides minimal benefit compared to helping others.
      • Example: Treating a terminally ill patient over a curable one solely because the former is worse off.
  • Issues of Rigidity:

    • Rawls’s framework imposes inflexible prioritization of the least advantaged, disregarding broader societal benefits and individual merit.
  • Harsanyi's Alternative:

    • Advocates for the expected-utility maximization principle:
      • Individuals in the original position should choose policies maximizing the average utility, reflecting collective well-being rather than prioritizing extremes.
      • This approach aligns with utilitarian principles and accounts for interpersonal utility comparisons, balancing fairness with practical outcomes.
  • Defense Against Rawls's Criticisms:

    • Harsanyi defends the use of probabilities in moral reasoning, countering Rawls's dismissal of subjective probabilities.
    • He explains that interpersonal utility comparisons are essential and feasible, as humans can empathize with others’ preferences and circumstances.
  • Broader Implications:

    • Harsanyi emphasizes that utilitarian principles, when correctly interpreted, allow for a balanced moral framework:
      • Recognizes the value of supererogatory (above duty) actions.
      • Avoids the extreme demands of classical utilitarianism or Rawls's rigid rules.
  • Practical Recommendations:

    • Harsanyi acknowledges the maximin principle’s utility in specific contexts, like income distribution or taxation, as an approximation tool rather than a moral foundation.
  • Final Assessment:

    • While Rawls raises significant moral questions, Harsanyi argues his solutions are flawed and overly simplistic.
    • Utilitarianism offers a more flexible and inclusive approach to justice, avoiding the discriminatory implications of Rawls's theory.

This critique underscores a fundamental philosophical debate: whether morality should prioritize fairness to the least advantaged (Rawls) or maximize collective well-being (utilitarianism).